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NOTE
WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE BURGER COURT
ATTACKS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Supreme Court recently decided three cases in one of the
most confusing areas of fourth amendment jurisprudence: warrantless
searches of vehicles.' In New York v. Belton, 2 the Court expanded the
authority of an arresting police officer to search the interior of an arres-
tee's vehicle. On the same day, in Robbins v. California,3 a plurality of the
Court required police officers, even those. with authority to conduct a
general warrantless search of a vehicle, to obtain warrants in order to
search most types of closed containers in the vehicle. Soon after, how-
ever, the Court expressed a desire to reconsider Robbins. 4 In United States
v. Ross, 5 this reconsideration led the Court to overrule Robbins and hold
that a police officer with probable cause to search a vehicle may conduct
a warrantless search of the vehicle and all containers found in the
vehicle.
6
Warrantless vehicle search decisions like Belton, Robbins, and Ross
play a critical role in balancing the concerns of effective law enforce-
1 A majority of the Supreme Court has referred to the law of vehicle searches as "this
troubled area." United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1982). BeforeRoss, a frustrated
Justice Powell remarked that "the law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is
intolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previ-
ously, let alone on how. . . cases should be decided." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,
430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), overrled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see
also United States v. Rivera, 654 F.2d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1981) ("As Justice Rehnquist once
observed, the law governing warrantless searches and seizures, especially those involving vehi-
cles is 'something less than a seamless web.' Eight years later the courts are still trying to
extricate themselves from that tangle."), vacated on other grounds, 684 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1982).
As used in this Note, the term "vehicle searches" refers to searches of vehicles, their
occupants, and their contents.
2 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see infra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
3 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982); see infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
4 When the Court granted certiorari in Ross, it directed the parties "to address the
question whether the Court should reconsider Robbins ... " United States v. Ross, 454 U.S.
891 (1981).
5 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see infra notes 114-43 and accompanying text.
6 - For a discussion of the recent decisions, see generally Wainger, The Warrant Requirement
for Container Searches and the "Well-Delineated" Exceptions: The New "Bright Line" Rules, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 115 (1981); Comment, Robbins and Belton: Inconristeny and Confuion Continue
to Reign Supreme in the Area of Vehicle Searches, 19 Hous. L. REv. 527 (1982); Comment, Search
and Seirure of Containers Found in Automobiles: The Supreme Court Struggles for a "Bright Line" Rule,
16 U. RICH. L. REv. 649 (1982); authorities cited infra notes 114, 144.
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ment and individual privacy. 7 Uncertainty about the constitutionality
of a warrantless search may lead police either to forego a legitimate
search or to violate an individual's privacy; rights. When police do con-
duct an unconstitutional search, whethertintentionally or accidentally,8
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule mandates the exclusion of the
illegally obtained evidence at trial. 9 Because the costs of uncertainty are
so great, 10 rules that are easily applied to a variety of situations are es-
sential. 1' The Supreme Court's vehicle search decisions, however, have
often confused rather than clarified the law.12
The recent decisions governing warrantless searches of vehicles and
their contents reveal that the Burger Court is struggling to simplify a
confusing area of law. Ironically, this Court's departure from tradi-
tional exigency-based approaches to vehicle searches has caused much of
the confusion. Instead of the traditional approaches, the Court has of-
fered new justifications for warrantless searches and "bright line" rules
to guide police. These rationales have proved unsatisfactory. The new
justifications are illogical and unconvincing; the "bright-line" rules shift
confusion from one area to another. Furthermore, the Court's treat-
ment of vehicle searches has led to unnecessary intrusions on the privacy
interests of vehicle users. The Court's approach is not the result of hos-
tility toward simplicity, logic, or individual rights. Rather, it is a mani-
festation of the Court's reluctance to apply the exclusionary rule as the
remedy for violations of fourth amendment rights.
7 When a police officer searches a vehicle, the vehicle's occupant has three interests at
stake: "an interest in moving on, an interest in control over his property, and an interest in
the secrecy of the car's contents." Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
HARv. L. REV. 835, 841 (1974).
8 Some courts have concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply when a police
officer acts reasonably and in good faith. See infia notes 9, 252. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to consider a "good faith" exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. See Illinois v. Gates, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982).
9 The judicially created exclusionary rule requires courts to exclude at trial all evidence
that police obtain by means that violate the fourth amendment. See Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Supreme Court has extended the rule to the states. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (plurality opinion). For further discussion of the exclusion-
ary rule, see infla notes 248-52 and accompanying text. The Court's expressed rationale for
the sanction of the exclusionary rule is that it will deter police from conducting unconstitu-
tional searches. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
10 Although opponents of the exclusionary rule criticize its severity, recent studies show
that courts rarely suppress evidence. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 221 n.c (5th ed. 1980).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1982) ("There is . .. no dispute
among judges about the importance of striving for clarification in this area of the law.");
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardizedl'rocedures":• The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
Sup. Cr. REV. 127, 141.




THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF WARRANTLESS
VEHICLE SEARCHES
Although the text of the fourth amendment proscribes only "unrea-
sonable" searches, 13 the Supreme Court has long held that warrantless
searches, except those falling within a small group of exceptions, 14 are
unreasonable per se and thus unconstitutional. 15 Among these excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are the "automobile exception"' 16 and
13 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("[Njothing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be con-
ducted pursuant to warrants. The terms of the Amendment simply mandate that the people
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures . . "), overruled, United States v. Ross,
102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
14 The principal exceptions to the warrant requirement are: search incident to arrest,
see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 394 U.S. 752 (1969); the automobile exception, see, e.g., Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); consent, see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); plain view, see, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam); hot
pursuit, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1969); stop and frisk, see, e.g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); emergency, see, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); and
prevention of loss or destruction of evidence, see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966). See generally Comment, The Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment
Pdnciples, 17 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 933, 933-34 nn.l-10 (1980).
15 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). The Supreme Court imposes
the warrant requirement because an "officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime" is unable to assess impartially the existence of probable cause to search.
Thus, the Court prefers that a "neutral and detached magistrate" make that determination.
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The warrant requirement also requires
a pre-search review of the existence of probable cause, preventing "hindsight from coloring
the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure." United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157, 2175 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 565 (1976)). The warrant requirement applies to the states. See Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
16 For a treatment of the "automobile exception," see generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE 508-44 (1978); Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception WithoutJustif-
cation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1980); Note, Warrantless Container Searches Under the Automobile and
Search Incident Excep tions, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185 (1980); Note, supra note 7; Comment,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from Carroll to Cardwell:
Inconsiitentdy Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. REv. 722 (1975); Comment, supra note 14;
Note, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Away From the Fourth Amend-
ment, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 637 (1980). The term "automobile exception" is misleading because
courts have also applied the exception to searches of other vehicles. See, e.g., United States v.
Olson, 670 F.2d 185 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (unpublished opinion) (airplane); United States v. Har-
ris, 627 F.2d 474, 475-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1980) (van); United States v.
Hudson, 601 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1979) (motor home); 2 W. LAFAVE, supra, at 508 n.2
(citing cases). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case in which the state of
Florida has contended that a warrantless search of the hold of a boat is valid under the
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the "search-incident-to-arrest" exception, 17 which courts frequently ap-
ply to allow the admission of evidence that police obtain by conducting
warrantless vehicle searches.18 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has
construed narrowly exceptions to the warrant requirement. 19
A. The Automobile Exception
1. Pre-Burger Court Developments
Until recently, the Supreme Court did not articulate an "automo-
bile exception" to the warrant requirement. 20 Rather than treating
automobiles as a distinct area of fourth amendment analysis, the Court
condoned warrantless searches of vehicles and other areas only in exi-
gent circumstances. 21
In Carroll v. United States, 22 decided in 1925, the Supreme Court first
considered the constitutionality of a warrantless vehicle search. In Car-
roll, federal agents had probable cause to search Carroll's vehicle 23 but,
automobile and search-incident-to-arrest exceptions. See Florida v. Casal, cert. granted 103 S.
Ct. 50 (1982).
17 For a treatment of the search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of vehicle
searches, see generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, at 598-608; Note, supra note 16, 9 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 185; Note, Cnminal Law: The Effect of Chimel v. California on Automobile Search
and Seizure, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 447 (1970); Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Road-
block to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626 (1970). Courts have also applied the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to vehicles other than automobiles. See, e.g., United States v.
Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (motor home), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1775 (1982);
United States v. Thomas, 536 F. Supp. 736, 743 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (airplane). When police
arrest the occupant of a vehicle considerably larger than an automobile, courts may apply the
"protective sweep" variation of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. This rule allows po-
lice to conduct a warrantless vehicle search for accomplices, but not for weapons or evidence.
See, e.g., United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1775 (1982).
18 This Note focuses on two exceptions to the warrant requirement that courts fre-
quently apply to uphold warrantless vehicle searches: the "automobile exception" and the
search-incident-to-arrest exception. See supra notes 16, 17. These exceptions are not mutually
exclusive; both may apply to a given fact situation. If a police officer mistakenly believes that
a particular exception validates a warrantless search, the search is constitutional if another
exception applies. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978). The Supreme Court
has also allowed warrantless vehicle searches on other grounds. See, e.g., South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973) (warrantless search of injured police officer's car to remove weapon believed to be
located there). See generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, at 563; Comment, supra note 16.
19 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979), limited on other grounds,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
20 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971) (plurality opinion), a
Supreme Court opinion used the term "automobile exception" for the first time. A majority
of the Court first used the term in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 5 (1977).
21 The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches conducted by police in other
exigent circumstances are constitutional. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1969).
22 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23 Id at 160. The federal agents had previous dealings with the vehicle's occupants and
knew that they were involved in Prohibition violations. See id; see also United States v. Ross,
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because they could not lawfully detain its occupants,24 the agents had to
conduct an immediate warrantless search or risk allowing the suspects to
drive the vehicle out of the jurisdiction before the agents could obtain a
warrant.25 The agents conducted the search and discovered contraband
liquor that led to the convictions of the vehicle's occupants. The
Supreme Court upheld the convictions.
2 6
The Carroll doctrine delineated two constitutional requirements for
a warrantless vehicle search. First, the law enforcement officials needed
probable cause to search the vehicle.27 Second, the Court required a
genuine threat that someone would move the vehicle before the officials
could obtain a search warrant. Thus "[i]n cases where the securing of a
warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used .... ,,28 In short, Car-
roll required both probable cause and exigency.2
9
102 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 n.5 (1982). In Carroll, Justice McReynolds challenged the finding of
probable cause. See 267 U.S. at 171 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
24 The agents did not see the vehicle's occupants commit a crime and, because the sus-
pected violation was a misdemeanor, the officers could not make an arrest. See Carroll, 267
U.S. at 137; see also United States v. Ross, 102 S Ct. 2157, 2178 n.6 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); 2 W. LAFAVE,xupra note 16, at 511 ("[T]he occupants of the car were not arrested
prior to the actual discovery of the [contraband] liquor and apparently could not have been
arrested.").
25 "[1]t is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." 267 U.S. at 153.
26 The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for the return of the seized
evidence. See id at 162.
27 Id at 156. For a discussion of the concept of probable cause, see generally 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 16, at 437-716.
28 267 U.S. at 156. Lower courts also construed the practicability requirement to pro-
scribe warrantless vehicle searches in cases in which probable cause existed sufficiently in
advance of the search to make the acquisition of a warrant reasonable. See 2 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 16, at 519-25, and cases cited therein. A plurality of the Court rejected this inter-
pretation in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974) (plurality opinion). See indfa note 54.
29 Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458, 460 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(officers with probable cause may conduct warrantless vehicle search if threat of mobility
exists); United States v. Preston, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (Carroll inapplicable absent threat
of mobility); Comment, supra note 16, at 727; Comment, supra note 14, at 938; Note, sura
note 16, 82 W. VA. L. REv. at 638.
Some members of the Court have construed Carroll as limited to searches for contraband,.
see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62-63 n.7 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing), or to searches authorized by statute, see United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87
(1948). See a/so Note, supra note 7, at 839 n.24.
This Note's interpretation of Carroll varies considerably from that of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-64 (1982). The Ross Court interpreted Carroll
to allow disparate treatment of vehicles. To support its interpretation, the Court relied on
legislation passed shortly after the drafting of the fourth amendment that allowed customs
officials to conduct warrantless vehicle searches based on probable cause alone. See id at 2162
n.6. The Court inferred from this legislation that the fourth amendment accords vehicles
diminished protection. The Court's reasoning is suspect. Because the legislation pertained to
searches by customs officials, the absence of a warrant requirement may well have been predi-
cated upon the fact that the vehicles were crossing the border. See id. at 2163 n.7. The Court
has recognized the government's need to conduct searches and stops at its borders. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Thus, the legislation may have
1982]
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The Warren Court never applied the Carroll doctrine to uphold a
warrantless vehicle search.30 In Preston v. United States,3' a unanimous
Warren Court rejected the contention that Carroll allowed police to
search a car after arresting its occupants and taking the vehicle into
custody. "[S]ince the men were under arrest at the police station and the
car was in police custody. . . [there was no] danger that the car would
be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction. '' 32 As in Carroll, the Preston
Court required proof of exigency before validating a warrantless
search.
33
Before 1970, courts relied almost exclusively on the search-incident-
to-arrest exception, rather than Carroll, to uphold warrantless vehicle
searches.3 4 When the Supreme Court limited the scope of the search-
indicated an understanding that customs officials may conduct warrantless searches of vehi-
cles crossing the border, not that police may routinely conduct warrantless searches of all
vehicles.
30 But cf Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). In Cooper, the Warren Court held
constitutional a warrantless search of an automobile that police had seized and impounded
pending forfeiture proceedings. The Court distinguished the case before it from Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), see infra notes 31-33, by asserting that the police in Cooper
had held the vehicle as evidence. 386 U.S. at 61. In Cooper, state law required the police to
hold the car. "It would be unreasonable," the Court concluded, "to hold that the police,
having to retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it." Id at 61-62.
31 376 U.S. 364 (1964). In Preston, police arrested the occupants of a parked car for
vagrancy. After driving the car to the police station and towing it to a parking lot, police
searched the vehicle without a warrant. They discovered evidence that led to the arrestees'
convictions for conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank. Id at 365-66. The Supreme Court
ruled that the search violated the fourth amendment. See id at 368.
32 Id at 368.
33 Later opinions have interpreted Preston differently. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 444 (1973) (Preston "stands only for the proposition that the search challenged there
could not be justified as one incident to an arrest."); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47
(1970) (police lacked probable cause to conduct search in Preston); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 61 (1967) (search in Preston unconstitutional because unrelated to arrest). The lan-
guage of Preston, however, illustrates that the Court refused to apply Carroll because no one
was likely to move the vehicle: "[S]ince the men were under arrest at the police station and
the car was in police custody. . .[there was no] danger that the car would be moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction." 376 U.S. at 368. Accord Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64-
65 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34 The Court, however, did apply Carroll to uphold warrantless vehicle searches that
preceded arrests. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165, 177-78 (1949); Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253-55 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701
(1931). Nevertheless, when police arrested suspects before conducting a search, thereby re-
moving the exigency required by Carroll, courts relied upon the search-incident-to-arrest ex-
ception. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 376 F.2d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir.) (search of automobile
lawful as incident to arrest), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888,
893 (8th Cir. 1966) (search of automobile in driveway constitutional as incident to arrest of
defendant at front door), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Jefferson v. United States, 349 F.2d
714, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (search of car trunk upheld as incident to arrest); see
also Moylan, The Automobile Exception What It Is and What It Is Not... A Rationale In Search Of
a Clearer Labe, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987, 1000-01 (1976).
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incident-to-arrest exception in Chimel v. Califormia, 35 however, "the con-
tinuing vitality and potential reach of the Carroll doctrine suddenly be-
come important.
'36
2. The Burger Court--Searches of Vehicles.
The Burger Court first considered the Carroll doctrine in Chambers v.
Maroney. 3 7 In Chambers, state police officers38 conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile that they had driven to the police station after
arresting the occupants for armed robbery.39 The Supreme Court held
that Carroll authorized the search.4 Although the Chambers Court re-
tained the probable cause requirement of the Carroll doctrine,4 1 the
Court effectively eviscerated the second requirement that the circum-
stances surrounding the search pose an actual threat of mobility. Unlike
the federal agents in Carroll, the police in Chambers had both the defend-
ants and the vehicle in custody at the time of the search, thus eliminat-
ing any threat of mobility while police sought a search warrant.42
Nevertheless, the majority treated the search as necessary to prevent an
arrestee or a confederate from moving the automobile before police
could obtain a search warrant.4 3 The threat of mobility was a fictitious
35 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
36 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, at 512.
37 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
38 Before Chambers, the Supreme Court had not applied the Carroll doctrine to a search
conducted by state law enforcement officers. For a discussion of the differences between fed-
eral and state law enforcement officers conducting vehicle searches, see generally Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973); Comment, supra note 16, at 729-30. The Court has
never held that differences between federal and state law enforcement activities require differ-
ent fourth amendment treatment.
39 399 U.S. at 44. Before Chambers, the Supreme Court had not applied Carroll to a
search conducted after an arrest. See supra note 34.
40 See 399 U.S. at 52.
41 Seeid at 51.
42 See id at 44.
43 For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand
seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a mag-
istrate and on the other hand canying out an immediate search without a warrant.
Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been searched
on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search and
it was a fleeting target for a search. The probable-cause factor still obtained
at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment
permits a warrantess seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant
is secured In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical conse-
quences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobi-
lization until a warrant is obtained.
Id at 52. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court's reference to an "immediate"
search at a station house after the arrest is comprehensible only if one assumes that an arres-
tee or confederate sought access to the vehicle while the vehicle was in police custody. Taken
in that sense, the threat that someone would move the vehicle creates the immediacy. "Im-
mediate" in the context of Chambers does not mean "as soon as police stopped the vehicle."
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one, however, in that the Court did not assert that anyone actually
sought to move the vehicle while it was in police custody. Thus, al-
though purporting to follow Carroll, the Chambers Court allowed a war-
rantless search based on probable cause alone." The Court's use of the
fiction left the vitality of the Carroll doctrine's exigency requirement
unclear.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,45 a plurality of the Court further ob-
fuscated the doctrine by refusing to hold that probable cause alone vali-
dated a warrantless46 vehicle search. Instead of providing a principled
basis for its holding that a post-arrest seizure and search of an automo-
bile on the arrestee's driveway was unconstitutional, the plurality
merely enumerated distinctions between Coolidge and earlier vehicle
search decisions.47 The plurality concluded that the search was uncon-
Accord Note, supra note 7, at 844. Thus, the Court's analysis in Chambers presupposes that
someone sought to move the vehicle.
44 Justice Harlan, in dissent, criticized the majority for abandoning the exigency re-
quirement. See 399 U.S. at 62-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Wilson, supra note 16, at 129
("pretext of exigency"); Comment, supra note 16, at 737 ("Chambers seems to have -modified
the Carroll doctrine so that the . . .potential mobility of an automobile . . .justifies] an
unwarranted search.'). The language of Chambers, however, is contrary to such an expansive
interpretation: "Neither Carroll nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every
conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made with-
out the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords." 399 U.S. at 50. Yet, despite this
language, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a principled application of
Chambers would not condone a warrantless vehicle search based on probable cause alone.
45 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion). In Coolidge, police arrested Coolidge at his
home in connection with a murder. Two and a half hours later, after refusing to allow Mrs.
Coolidge to use the family cars, the police had them towed from Coolidge's driveway to the
police station. Id at 447. Two days later, police searched the cars and discovered evidence
that they used to secure Coolidge's conviction. Id at 448.
46 The police had obtained a search warrant from the State Attorney General, who was
involved in the investigation. But, because the Attorney General was not a "neutral and
detached magistrate required by the Constitution, the search [stood] on no firmer ground
than if there had been no warrant at all." Id. at 453.
47 The plurality supplied a number of reasons for concluding that Caroll and Chambers
did not justify the search. First, "the police had known for some time of the probable role of
the [defendant's] car in the crime." Id at 460. The Court thus suggested that the police had
an opportunity to obtain a warrant before conducting the search. But this reason appears
spurious because the police had obtained what they believed to be a valid warrant before
searching the vehicle. Id at 453; see supra note 46. Furthermore, in a later case, a plurality of
the Court concluded that a prior opportunity to obtain a warrant does not render a warrant-
less vehicle seizure unconstitutional. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974) (plural-
ity opinion); infra note 54. Second, the Coolidge plurality noted that the defendant had ample
opportunity to destroy any incriminating evidence. See 403 U.S. at 460. This indicated a lack
of probable cause to search the vehicle. But see id at 464 ("Here there was probable cause
• . ."). Third, the defendant was not using the car for an illegal purpose at the time of the
search. Id at 460. But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 585 (1974) (plurality opinion)
(upholding conviction based on a warrantless seizure and examination of exterior of a vehicle
even though the defendant was not using the vehicle for an illegal purpose at the time of the
seizure). Fourth, the objects sought "were neither stolen nor contraband nor dangerous." 403
U.S. at 460. But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 585 (1974) (plurality opinion) (uphold-
ing conviction based on a warrantless seizure and examination of exterior of a vehicle despite
1982] VEHICLE SEARCHES
stitutional because "no exigent circumstances justified the police in pro-
ceeding without a warrant,"48 a remark seemingly at odds with
Chambers. 49
Three years after Coolidge, in Cardwell v. Lewis, 50 a plurality of the
Court, having concluded that a police examination of the exterior of a
vehicle did not constitute a "search, 5 1 nonetheless continued to erode
the Carroll doctrine by emphasizing ajustification for warrantless vehicle
searches distinct from exigency. Despite mentioning that "[a]n underly-
ing factor in the Carroll-Chambers line of decisions has been the exigent
circumstances that exist in connection with movable vehicles,152 the
plurality focused on the "lesser expectation of privacy" that people have
in vehicles as opposed to residences. 53 The Court reasoned that these
the absenceof contraband, stolen or dangerous objects). Fifth, neither Coolidge nor his wife
could have gained access to the vehicle. 403 U.S. at 460-61. Thus, the Coolidge plurality,
unlike the Chambers majority, refused to fabricate a threat of mobility and instead considered
the actual exigencies in the case. Finally, the vehicle was unoccupied and on private prop-
erty. Id at 463 n.20. For a discussion of the significance of this conclusion, see in/a notes 243-
47 and accompanying text.
48 403 U.S. at 464.
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. A plurality of the Court has adopted a
narrow interpretation of Coolidge. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974) (plurality
opinion) (Coolidge prevented warrantless seizure of automobile located on private property).
50 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). After arresting Lewis in connection with a
murder committed with a car, police, without a warrant, seized his car from a public parking
lot. The prosecution used evidence that police obtained in a warrantless examination of the
exterior of the vehicle in order to obtain a conviction. Lewis lost on appeal, see id. at 585, but
successfully petitioned a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. Lewis v. Cardwell,
354 F. Supp. 26 (S.D. Ohio 1972). After the court of appeals affirmed, Lewis v. Cardwell, 476
F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1973), the Supreme Court reversed. 417 U.S. at 596.
51 417 U.S. at 588-89. The four dissenters questioned this conclusion and considered it
irrelevant, arguing that the police action was also an unconstitutional seizure. Id at 597.
Justice Powell, concurring in the result, did not consider the merits. Id. at 596.
52 Id at 590.
53 See id The Cardwell plurality apparently relied on the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" analysis proposed in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Harlan believed that police activities infringing upon an individual's
protected expectations of privacy violate the fourth amendment. He described his test for
determining whether an expection was protected as a "twofold requirement, first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Id at 316 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Harlan considered all intrusions on such protected expectations of privacy as
violations of the fourth amendment. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979), a
majority of the Court adopted this "monolithic" approach. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rav. 349, 388 (1974).
In contrast to this "monolithic" approach, the Burger Court's automobile exception sug-
gests a movement toward a "sliding scale" approach to the fourth amendment. Rather than
concluding that the presence or absence of reasonable privacy expectations determines the
application or nonapplication of the fourth amendment, the Court has held that one aspect of
the fourth amendment, the warrant requirement, does not apply when people have lesser
expectations of privacy. In order to prevent this inquiry into relative privacy expectations
from converting "the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot," Amsterdam,
supra, at 393, the Court has had to generalize its diminished expectations of privacy analysis
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:105
diminished expectations of privacy justify diminished fourth amend-
ment protection.5
4
In Texas v. White, 55 decided a year after Cardwell, the Court eradi-
cated any remaining vestige of the Carroll doctrine's exigency require-
ment. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that a warrantless search
of a vehicle was constitutional because the police who conducted the
search had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence
of a crime;5 6 the Court did not consider the actual mobility of the
vehicle.
Having abandoned exigency as a rationale for allowing warrantless
vehicle searches based on probable cause, the Burger Court has ad-
vanced other reasons to support its treatment of these cases. First, the
Court has asserted that people have lesser expectations of privacy in ve-
hicles than they do in residences and closed containers.57
Second, the Court has stressed the "inherent mobility" of
automobiles. Although the Court has indicated that "inherent mobil-
ity" alone is not sufficient to justify warrantless searches, 58 it has con-
by assuming that people always have lesser privacy expectations in automobiles. See infra
notes 209, 213 and accompanying text.
54 Although the Cardwell plurality's reliance on privacy expectations was of questionable
precedential value because the plurality did not consider the police activity to be a "search,"
set supra note 51 and accompanying text, a majority of the Court later embraced the plural-
ity's reasoning. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979), limited on other grounds,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
561 (1976). The Cardwell plurality found that individuals have lesser expectations of privacy
in automobiles because an automobile's "function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are
in plain view." 417 U.S. at 590. The Court later reasoned that an automobile's exposure to
governmental regulation diminishes the privacy expectations of its occupants. See United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
The Cardwell Court also rejected the position that a prior opportunity to obtain a search
warrant renders a later warrantless search unconstitutional. See 417 U.S. at 595-96. In Card-
well, police had suspected for over two months before they seized the defendant's vehicle that
the defendant had used his car to commit a crime. See id at 586-87. Thus, it appears that
Carroll, to the extent that it required a warrant when "reasonably practicable," see sura note
28 and accompanying text, did not survive Cardwell Surely it was reasonably practicable for
police to obtain a search warrant in the two months preceding the arrest.
55 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). Police arrested White while he was trying to cash
fraudulent checks at a drive-through window of a bank. An officer drove White's car to the
police station, where police conducted a warrantless search and uncovered four checks that
the trial court later admitted into evidence.
56 See id at 68; Note, rupra note 16, 82 W. VA. L. REV. at 651 ("After White, it appeared
that for all practical purposes all that was needed to validate a warrantless search or seizure of
an automobile was probable cause."); see also Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982)
(per curiam) (probable cause justified warrantless vehicle search); Colorado v. Bannister, 449
U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam) (police officer with probable cause to believe that objects in a car
were stolen could seize those objects without a warrant).
57 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
58 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on
other groumds, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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cluded that "[o]ur treatment of automobiles has been based in part on
their inherent mobility .-59,
Third, the Court has focused on the administrative burdens that
the detention of vehicles pending issuance of a warrant would impose on
law enforcement agencies.60 If the Court were to proscribe warrantless
vehicle searches, it would force police either to leave a vehicle where
they stopped it or to seize and hold the vehicle until a magistrate issued
a search warrant.61 The first alternative threatens evidence by subject-
ing the vehicle to theft or intrusion. The second alternative requires
that police departments provide "the people and equipment necessary
to transport impounded automobiles to some central location [and
maintain an] .. .appropriate location where [the vehicles] could be
kept, with due regard to the safety of the vehicles and their contents.
'62
The Court has apparently concluded that both of these alternatives un-
duly burden police, and thus allows warrantless vehicle searches based
on probable cause alone.
3. The Burger Court-Searches of Containers In Vehicles
Having concluded that the automobile exception applies whenever
police have probable cause to search a vehicle, the Burger Court re-
cently considered the scope of this exception. Specifically, the Court
considered whether a police officer's authority to conduct a warrantless
vehicle search based on probable cause authorizes him to search closed
containers in the vehicle.
63
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 64 the Court considered the constitutionality of
59 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); see Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct.
3079, 3081 (1982) (per curiam) ("It is thus clear that the justification to conduct [a warrant-
less vehicle search] does not vanish once the car has been immobilized. . . "); Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 440 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), overruled
on otherground, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982):
[O]ne need not demonstrate that aparticular automobile was capable of being
moved, but that automobiles as a class are inherently mobile, and a defendant
seeking to suppress evidence obtained from an automobile should not be
heard to say that this particular automobile had broken down, was in a park-
ing lot under the supervision of the police, or the like.
60 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.10, 765-66 n.14 (1979), limited on
other grounds, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
61 &e id at 765-66 n.14. The acquisition of a search warrant by telephone is another
alternative. See Note, Warrantless Automobile Searches and Telephonic Search Warrants: Should the
"Automobile Erception" Be Redrawn?, 7 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 1031 (1980).
62 442 U.S. at 765-66 n.14.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), limited, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
64 442 U.S. 753 (1979), limited, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Police,
acting upon probable cause that Sander's suitcase contained marihuana, stopped the taxicab
in which he was travelling. The taxi driver opened the trunk, where the suitcase was located,
and the police opened the suitcase, which contained marihuana. The trial court admitted
this evidence, 442 U.S. at 756, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the conviction,
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a warrantless search of a suitcase in an automobile. In an earlier deci-
sion, United Stales v. Chadwick,65 the Court had concluded that police
with probable cause to search luggage must obtain a warrant before
searching it.66 In Sanders, the Court sought to reconcile Chadwick's war-
rant requirement for luggage with the automobile exception. The Court
had to decide whether the presence of luggage in a vehicle nullifies the
protection of the warrant requirement that the luggage would otherwise
enjoy.
Although recognizing that luggage in an automobile is "as mobile
as the vehicle in which it rides,"'67 the Court concluded that the automo-
bile exception did not allow a warrantless luggage search for two rea-
sons.68 First, the Court found that people have greater expectations of
holding that the warrantless search violated the fourth amendment. Id The Supreme Court
affirmed. Id at 766.
65 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
66 In Chadwick, federal agents had probable cause to believe that defendants' footlocker
contained evidence of a crime. After the defendants placed the footlocker in the trunk of a
car, the agents arrested them and seized the footlocker. The agents conducted a warrantless
search of the footlocker an hour and a half later, and discovered that it contained marihuana.
Id at 4-5. Because the agents had probable cause to believe that the footlocker, not the
vehicle, contained evidence, Chadwick was not an automobile-exception case. The govern-
ment, therefore, did not contend that the automobile exception validated the search; rather it
argued that the reasons for allowing warrantless searches of vehicles also apply to warrantless
searches of containers. Id at 11-12. The Court disagreed, holding that, absent exigent cir-
cumstances, police must obtain a warrant to search luggage. Id at 13, 15-16. It refused to
accept the government's analogy between vehicles and luggage for two reasons. First, the
Court asserted:
The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not
apply to [luggage]. Luggage contents are not open to public view. . . nor is
luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing
basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, lug-
gage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expec-
tations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an
automobile.
Id at 13. Second, storing a vehicle pending issuance of a warrant is more difficult than
storing luggage. See id n.7.
Before and after Chadwick, lower federal courts disagreed on whether the automobile
exception authorized warrantless searches of containers located in vehicles. Compare United
States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147, 152 & n.6, 153 (5th Cir. 1979) (authorization to search air-
plane did not extend to duffle bag) and United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979) (luggage search unconstitutional) with United States v.
Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 527 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909 (1979) (Chambers authorized
search of satchel in vehicle); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1103-05 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1974), cert,
denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975) (warrantless search of trunks in stationary vehicle constitutional)
and United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1974) (search of luggage in trunk of
taxicab constitutional).
67 442 U.S. at 763.
68 Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that Sanders was not an auto-
mobile-exception case. In Sanders, as in Chadwick, see supra note 66, police had probable cause
to search luggage in an automobile, but did not have probable cause to search the automobile
itself. Thus "[t]he relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coin-
cidental." Id at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring). A majority of the Court adopted ChiefJus-
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privacy in luggage than in automobiles69 and stressed that this greater
expectation is not diminished by the presence of luggage in an automo-
bile.70 Consequently, the Court indicated that police could conduct
warrantless searches of containers in vehicles only when "their contents
can be inferred from their outward appearance," for such containers
"by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of
privacy."'
Second, the Court considered "[t]he difficulties in seizing and secur-
ing automobiles" pending issuance of a warrant to be greater than the
difficulties involved in seizing and securing containers.7 2 The Court
predicated its willingness to allow immediate warrantless searches of ve-
hicles upon its refusal to impose a constitutional requirement that law
enforcement agencies seize and hold vehicles until police obtain a war-
rant.7 3 Because "[n]o comparable burdens are likely to exist with re-
spect to the seizure of personal luggage," the Court was willing to
impose a warrant requirement upon police conducting luggage
searches.74 The Court suggested, however, that it would allow a war-
.rantless luggage search based upon probable cause alone if a threat ex-
isted that someone would move the container before police could obtain
a warrant.
75
The reasoning of the Court in Sanders was identical to that in Chad-
wick. 76 By refusing to expand the scope of the automobile exception
when its rationales did not apply, the Sanders Court indicated that mere
presence in a vehicle did not dilute the fourth amendment protection
accorded to luggage; police would need a warrant before conducting a
search.
Robbins v. California77 presented the Court with a difficult variation
of the situation in Sanders. In Robbins, police officers had probable cause
to believe that the defendant's vehicle, but not any particular container
within the vehicle, contained marihuana. 78 Upon searching the vehicle,
the officers discovered two oblong packages, wrapped in opaque plastic,
in a recessed luggage compartment. The officers opened the packages
tice Burger's interpretation of Sanders in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2166-67
(1982).
69 See 442 U.S. at 764-65.
70 See id at 764.
71 Id at 764 n.13.
72 id at 763 n.10.
73 Set id at 765 n.14.
74 Id
75 See id at 763 & n. 1.
76 See supra note 66.
77 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982).
78 Two officers stopped Robbins for driving erratically, see id at 422, and upon ap-
proaching his station wagon, smelled marihuana.
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and discovered two bricks of marihuana.79 The trial court admitted the
marihuana to convict Robbins.80
Four members of the Supreme Court 81 held that the Sanders rule,
proscribing warrantless searches of luggage in vehicles,8 2 applied to the
less substantial containers in Robbins83 and to all containers that do not
reveal their contents.8 4 The plurality refused to adopt a rule affording
greater protection to "worthy" containers for two reasons. First, a dis-
tinction between luggage and less substantial containers "has no basis in
the language or meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 85 Second, "it is
difficult if not impossible to perceive any objective criteria by which"
police officers and courts could distinguish between various types of con-
tainers.86 Thus, the plurality rule required police to obtain a warrant to
search all closed containers located in vehicles even if the police could
conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile
exception.
In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stevens also refused to distinguish between various types of containers.
The dissenters, however, argued for a rule that would extend the auto-
mobile exception to all containers in vehicles.
87
79 Id
80 After the California appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of yanders. Robbins v. California, 443 U.S. 903
(1979). On remand, the state court held that Sanders made unlawful the search of a briefcase
and tote bag in Robbins's car, but concluded that Sanders did not make the search of the
opaque containers unconstitutional. See People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 780, 782 (1980), reo'd, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
81 justice Stewart wrote the plurality opinion, in which justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall joined. 453 U.S. at 422. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without
an opinion. Id at 429. justice Powell concurred in the judgment. Id
82 See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
83 See 453 U.S. at 428.
84 The Robbins plurality would have allowed a warrantless search of a container if it
"clearly announce[d] its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise." Id; see aso Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979), limited on other
,ground, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Federal courts of appeals have held
that various circumstances can reveal a container's contents. See, e.g., United States v. Mar-
shall, 672 F.2d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (environment of container); United
States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203-04 (4th Cir.) (odor), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2928 (1982).
Although the plurality did not consider this exception to the rule proscribing warrantless
container searches applicable to the packages in Robbinr, see 453 U.S. at 428, justice Rehn-
quist disagreed. See id at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (search fell "squarely within"
exception).
85 453 U.S. at 426.
86 Id
87 See id at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 444 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). justice Rehnquist also objected to the application of the exclusionary rule to
the states and to the warrant requirement. See id at 437. justice Stevens maintained that the
scope of a warrantless vehicle search should be as broad as the search that a magistrate could
authorize in a search warrant, and that a magistrate's warrant to search an automobile could
authorize a search of the packages in the automobile. See id at 449 & n.8. The Court later
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Only Justice Powell, who concurred in the plurality's judgment,
would have refused to treat all containers similarly. He would have
extended warrant protection only to those containers that "generally
[serve] as a repository for personal effects or. . .[have] been sealed in a
manner manifesting a reasonable expectation that the contents will not
be open to public scrutiny.""" Justice Powell considered the packages in
Robbins to be within his definition of protected containers. 89
4. Summag
At the end of the 1980 Term, the Burger Court clearly would apply
the automobile exception to authorize warrantless vehicle searches
whenever police had probable cause to search a vehicle. The exigency
requirement of Carroll had disappeared. The scope of the automobile
exception was less clear. Four Justices refused to extend the exception to
containers located in vehicles if the containers did not reveal their con-
tents.9° One other, Justice Powell, would have reached the same result
only if the containers normally served as repositories for personal effects
.or were sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable expectation that
their contents would remain private.9' Three other Justices would sub-
ject all containers located in vehicles to warrantless automobile-excep-
tion searches.
92
B. The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception
The search-incident-to-arrest exception, another judicially created
exception to the warrant requirement, authorizes warrantless searches
incident to lawful arrests.93 Police do not need probable cause to search
in order to conduct such searches. Adhering to the dicta of early deci-
sions,94 the Supreme Court once allowed police to search the entire
adopted Justice Stevens's approach in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). See infla
notes 114-37.
88 453 U.S. at 432. Concluding that they should adopt as the existing rule the "narrow-
est grounds" for the Robbins decision, lower courts adopted Justice Powell's concurring posi-
tion when applying Robbins, because if Powell's test would invalidate a warrantless search, a
majority of the Supreme Court would also invalidate the search. See United States v. Mar-
tino, 664 F.2d 860, 872-83 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Pillo, 522 F. Supp. 855, 866-67
(M.D. Pa. 1981).
89 See 453 U.S. at 429.
90 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
92 See sura note 87 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). An arrest is lawful when the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime.
94 E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (dictum) ('The right without a
search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing
crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crme. . . is not to be doubted.'); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
158 (1925) (dictum) ("When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon
his person or in his control which it is unlawful to have and which may be used to prove the
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premises of a residence after arresting a person located there,95 as long as
the intensity of the search was consistent with the nature of the objects
that police sought.96 Courts frequently relied on this exception to up-
hold warrantless vehicle searches. 97 But in Chime! v. Caliori'a, 98 the
Warren Court limited the scope of the search-incident-to-arrest excep-
tion to that necessitated by exigency. Since then, the development of
this exception has paralleled that of the automobile exception-the Bur-
ger Court has departed from an exigency-based approach.
In Chime, which involved a warrantless search of an arrestee's
home, the Warren Court limited the scope of a warrantless search inci-
dent to arrest to "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immedi-
ate control.' "99 The Court concluded that a law enforcement officer's
need to deny the arrestee access to a weapon or evidence justified a war-
rantless search. The Chime! Court refused to condone warrantless
searches of areas beyond the arrestee's immediate control because it
would not be necessary for the protection of police or evidence. 100 Thus,
offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution."); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dictum).
95 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947). In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 31 (1925), the Court held unconsti-
tutional a search of an arrestee's home following an off-premises arrest. See generaly LaFave,
Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court. Further Ventures Into the "Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL.
9 (1972).
96 "The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search for two
small cancelled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen
automobile or an illegal still." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947). The
Supreme Court overruled or distinguished earlier decisions which gave the search-incident-to-
arrest exception a narrower construction. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66
(1950), overruled Trumpiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947) distinguished United States v. Leftkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) and
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
97 See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 376 F.2d 98 (9th Cir.) (warrantless vehicle search up-
held as incident to a lawful warrantless arrest), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Harris v.
Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 1966) (defendant arrested at front door, warrantless
search of automotible in driveway authorized), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Jackson v.
United States, 352 F.2d 490, 490 (5th Cir. 1965) (warrantless vehicle search authorized as
incident to arrest), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 825 (1966). The Supreme Court upheld warrantless
vehicle searches in Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254-55 (1938) (automobile in garage)
and United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (boat), but did not specify whether it
relied on Carroll or the search-incident-to-arrest exception. In Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964), the Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception did not ap-
ply to a warrantless search of a vehicle "remote in time or place from the arrest."
98 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Police arrested Chimel at his home for burglary. They had a
warrant for his arrest, but lacked a search warrant; nevertheless, they searched the entire
house and obtained evidence that the trial court later admitted. Id. at 753-54. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction. See id at 768.
99 Id at 763. The Court cited with approval Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (proscribing a search-incident-to-arrest "remote in time or place from the arrest').
100 See 395 U.S. at 763. The dissent argues that although evidence of the burglary was
not within the "immediate control" of the arrestee, his wife could have destroyed the evidence
while police sought a search warrant. See id at 775 (White, J., dissenting).
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Chimel is analogous to Carroll: Carroll required exigent circumstances to
validate a warrantless automobile search,101 and Chimel employs exi-
gency to define the scope of a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. According to such an exigency-based approach, a search incident
to arrest may encompass the person of the arrestee, 10 2 as well as the
area 10 3 and any containers10 4 within his immediate control.
Although the Burger Court has only recently applied the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to uphold a conviction based on evidence
obtained in a warrantless vehicle search, 0 5 its decision in United States v.
Robinson 10 6 indicated that it would construe broadly the exception in the
context of vehicle-related arrests. In Robinson, the Court held that the
exception authorizes police who have made custodial arrests 10 7 for traf-
fic violations to search the arrestee's person without a warrant. 108 Ap-
parently following Chime!, the majority in Robinson upheld such a search
as necessary to protect the safety of the arresting officer.' 09
The Robinson majority, however, may have actually exceeded the
limits set in Chime! by validating a warrantless search of a cigarette
package removed from the arrestee's pocket. 110 The dissent pointed out
that once the officer took the package, the arrestee could no longer gain
access to it. 1 Because the package was not within the arrestee's imme-
diate control, Chime! did not authorize a warrantless search." 2 Thus,
the majority in Robinson betrayed a willingness to apply the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception to a vehicle-related search despite the absence
101 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973).
103 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
104 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
105 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). For a discussion of Beion, see infia notes
144-58 and accompanying text.
106 414 U.S. 218 (1973). After arresting Robinson for driving with a revoked license, a
police officer conducted a routine search of his person and discovered a crumpled cigarette
package in his jacket pocket. The officer opened the package and discovered heroin inside.
The trial court admitted this evidence to convict Robinson. Id at 220-23.
107 When a police officer conducts a "custodial arrest," he takes custody of the arrestee.
See infra note 161.
108 See 414 U.S. at 224.
109 Both Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), a case with facts and
outcome similar to Robinson, differed from other cases involving searches incident to arrest
because they did not involve a threat that the arrestees would destroy evidence. The Robinson
Court recognized that there would be no tangible evidence of traffic violations and no need to
conduct a warrantless search to protect evidence. Thus, only protection of the arresting of-
ficers justified the Robinson and Gustafson searches. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. For a discus-
sion of searches incident to arrests for traffic violations, see LaFave, supra note 11, at 150-61;
infia note 239 and accompanying text.
110 In neither Robinson nor Gustafson did the majority distinguish between a search of the
person of the arrestee and a search of a container found on his person.
111 See 414 U.S. at 255-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112 Id
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of the exigent circumstances that justify the exception. 13
C. Ross and Belton: Recent Developments in the Burger Court's
Vehicle Jurisprudence
1. The Automobile Exception.- United States v. Ross
United States v. Ross 114 provided the Supreme Court with the oppor-
tunity to reconsider the Robbins rule, which required warrants for
searches of containers in vehicles.' '1 In Ross, District of Columbia police
officers stopped Ross's car after receiving an informant's tip that Ross
was selling narcotics.' 16 After noticing a bullet on the front seat and
finding a gun in the glove compartment, one of the officers used Ross's
key to open the car's trunk, where he found a closed paper bag. The
officer opened the bag to discover "a number of glassine bags containing
white powder" that was later determined to be heroin.' 17 At no time did
the police obtain a warrant to search the bag.1 18 Denying a motion to
suppress, the trial court admitted the heroin to convict Ross.1 19 The
court of appeals, however, concluded that the search of the paper bag
violated the fourth amendment. 120 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to reconsider Robbins 121 and reversed.
12 2
Justice Stevens, writing for a six-member majority, extended the
scope of the automobile exception to all containers inside vehicles:
113 Robinson also expands police power to conduct warrantless searches incident to arrests
by allowing police to conduct such searches whether or not they believe that an arrestee may
gain access to weapons or evidence. Thus, even if an arresting officer does not believe that a
search is necessary to protect himself or evidence, he still has the "general authority" to
conduct the search. Id at 234; see a/so LaFave, supra note 11.
114 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). For a discussion ofRoss, see generally 2 LAFAvE,supra note 16,
at 169-77 (Supp. 1983); Latzer, Searching Cars and Their Contents: United States v. Ross, 18
GRIM. L. BULL. 381 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Search and Seizure, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 62, 176 (1982); 66 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1982).
115 The Court granted certiorari in Ross to determine whether to reconsider Robbins. 454
U.S. 891 (1981).
116 A previously reliable informant notified police officers that Ross was selling narcotics
from the trunk of his car, and told them where the car was parked. The officers drove to the
location, found the car unoccupied, confirmed that the car was registered to Ross, and left the
area to avoid arousing suspicion. They returned five minutes later to see Ross driving the car
away and proceeded to stop the car. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
117 Id A subsequent warrantless search of the trunk of the car at the police station un-
covered a zippered red leather pouch containing $3,200. Id
118 Id
119 The trial court also admitted money that police found in a zippered leather pouch.
Id
120 See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc),revd, 102 S.
Ct. 2157 (1982). Before the en banc hearing, a three-judge panel of the court of appeals held
that the search of the paper bag was constitutional, but reversed the conviction on other
grounds. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 1980) (search of zippered
pouch violated Sanders and therefore trial court erred by admitting money).
121 See 454 U.S. 891 (1981).
122 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173 (1982).
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We hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by [the
automobile] exception is no broader and no narrower than a magis-
trate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause justi-
fies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search.'
23
The Court's explanation for this broad rule revealed a marked de-
parture from the rationales of earlier decisions. 124 Perhaps aware that
neither the old "exigency" rationale nor the more recent "diminished
privacy expectations" and "administrative burdens" rationales for the
automobile exception would support its broad rule, 125 the Court turned
elsewhere for support.
First, the Court contended that the prior automobile-exception
cases authorized police to conduct warrantless searches of containers lo-
cated in vehicles if they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained evidence of a crime.' 26 Dismissing Robbins 127 and distinguish-
ing Sanders, 128 the Court relied on Carroll, in which police found contra-
band in a car's upholstery, and Chambers, in which the evidence was
located in a concealed compartment. 29 The Court also relied on two
pre-Chambers opinions that upheld warrantless searches of containers in
vehicles when police had probable cause to search the vehicles.
130
Second, the Court stressed the needs of law enforcement officials.
Concluding that criminals will almost always carry contraband in con-
tainers, the Court reasoned "that the practical consequences of the Car-
roll decision would be largely nullified if the permissible scope of a
123 Id at 2172.
124 Despite this departure, the result in Ross was foreseeable. After Justice Stewart's re-
tirement, only three members of the Robbins plurality remained on the Court: Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and White. The same number of Justices-Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stevens---had dissented, advocating the extension of the automobile exception to all contain-
ers in vehicles. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Justice Powell had indicated that
he might adopt the dissenters' approach in a future case. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 435 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, with Justice Powell's vote, either ChiefJustice
Burger's or Justice O'Conner's vote would have sufficed to establish the Ross rule.
125 See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
126 See 102 S. Ct. at 2169-70.
127 See id at 2172 ("[A]lthough we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was no
Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judgment and the reasoning we adopt
today was not presented by the parties in that case.").
128 "Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our hold-
ing in that case [that police with probable cause to search luggage in a vehicle, and without
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, must obtain a warrant to search the luggage.]"
Id Although this may be a valid interpretation of the strict holding of Sanders, see supra note
68, the Sanders Court actually articulated a rule inconsistent with Ross: that police with prob-
able cause to search a vehicle need a warrant to search luggage in the vehicle. See supra notes
64-75 and accompanying text.
129 See 102 S. Ct. at 2169. See generally supra notes 22-28, 37-44 and accompanying text.
130 See 102 S. Ct. at 2169. For a discussion of the Court's use of authority, see supra note
29; infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
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warrantless search of an automobile did not include containers and
packages found inside the vehicle."' 3 ' Thus, the Court assumed a need
for a robust automobile exception and extended the exception's scope to
satisfy this need.
The Court also concluded that a warrant requirement for contain-
ers in vehicles would compel police to seize and hold vehicles until they
could obtain a warrant to search the containers. Otherwise, "police
could never be certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet
undiscovered portion of the vehicle."' 3 2 This, in turn, would make the
automobile exception unnecessary, for if police must hold a vehicle
pending issuance of a warrant to search containers in the vehicle, they
could also seek a warrant to search the vehicle itself.'33
Finally, the Court turned to the privacy interests of vehicle owners
and occupants. It concluded that a rule allowing warrantless searches of
vehicles, while disallowing such searches of containers in the vehicles,
would lead to intrusions on privacy: "[P]rohibiting police from opening
immediately a container in which the object of the search is most likely
to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle
would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests .... ,,134
The Ross Court placed two limits on the scope of its expanded auto-
mobile exception. First, by adhering to its "holding" in Sanders, "35 the
Court continues to proscribe warrantless searches of containers in vehi-
cles when probable cause to search focuses on the container specifically,
and not on the vehicle generally.' 36 Second, the Court requires that the
nature of the objects sought delimit the scope and intensity of warrant-
less vehicle searches.'
3 7
Justices Blackmun and Powell joined the majority opinion and
judgment. Their concurring opinions, however, suggest that their desire
'31 102 S. Ct. at 2170.
132 Id at 2171 n.28.
133 This rationale is implicit in the Ross Court's discussion of the "practical considera-
tions that justify a warrantless search. . . ." Id The Court concludes that a requirement
that police hold vehicles while seeking warrants to search containers "would be directly in-
consistent with the rationale supporting the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. " Id
'34 Id
135 See supra note 128.
136 See 102 S. Ct. at 2179 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall doubted whether
this limitation would be practically significant: "In practice, the Court's rule may amount to
a wholesale authorization for police to search any car from top to bottom when they have
suspicion, whether localized or general, that it contains contraband." Id at 2182 n.14 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
137 Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a
garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable
cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will
not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does




for "an authoritative ruling"' 38 and "a readily understood and applied
rule,"'139 rather than agreement with the majority's reasoning, prompted
them to join the majority.
In a well-argued dissent, Justice Marshall accused the majority of
adopting "an unprecedented 'probable cause' exception to the warrant
requirement."'140 Justice Marshall contended that neither the "dimin-
ished privacy expectations" nor "administrative burdens" rationales jus-
tified the broad scope of the majority's automobile exception,14' and
that the majority's alternative rationales failed to support its position.'
42
Furthermore, he considered illogical the majority's decision to equate
the scope of an automobile-exception search with the scope of a search
that a magistrate could authorize.
43
2. The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception: New York v. Belton
In New York v. Belton, '44 the Court expanded the scope of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception in a vehicle-search case. In Belton, a
state trooper arrested the occupants of a speeding car for possession of
marihuana1 45 The trooper searched the car's passenger compartment
where he found a jacket belonging to Belton. The trooper found cocaine
in a pocket of the jacket.' 46 After a trial court denied his motion to sup-
press the evidence, Belton pleaded guilty. 147 The New York Court of
138 Id at 2173 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
139 Id (Powell, J., concurring).
140 Id at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's dis-
sent. Justice White wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See id at 2173 (White, J., dissenting).
141 Id at 2176 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142 Id at 2179.
143 The majority's sleight-of-hand ignores the obvious differences between the
function served by a magistrate in making a determination of probable cause
and the function of the automobile exception. [Although relevant to the au-
tomobile exception, it] is irrelevant to a magistrate's function whether the
items subject to search are mobile, may be in danger of destruction, or are
impractical to store, or whether an immediate search would be less intrusive
than a seizure without a warrant. A magistrate's only concern is whether
there is a probable cause to search them. . . .Because the scope of a warrant-
less search should depend on the scope of the justification for dispensing with
a warrant, the entire premise of the majority's opinion fails to support its
conclusion.
Id at 2177 (emphasis in original).
144 453 U.S. 454 (1981). For a discussion of Beton, see generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 16,
at 152-60 (Supp. 1983); Note, Arestee's Scope of Immediate ControL An Expansive Defmition, 28
Loy. L. REV. 359 (1982); 47 Mo. L. REv. 545 (1982); 9 Ohio N.U.L. REv. 153 (1982); 9
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 919 (1982).
145 After stopping the car for speeding and asking to see respondent's driver's license and
automobile registration, the trooper "smelled burnt marihuana and [saw] on the floor of the
car an envelope marked 'Supergold' that he associated with marihuana." Id at 455-56. The
Court assumed that the subsequent arrest was lawful. See id at 456-57.
146 Id at 456.
'47 Id
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Appeals reversed the conviction,148 holding the search-incident-to-arrest
exception inapplicable because the arrestees were unable to gain access
to the jacket at the time of the search. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari 49 and reversed, upholding the conviction. 150
Five members of the Court15' held that the search-incident-to-ar-
rest exception authorizes police who have arrested the occupant of a
vehicle to search, without a warrant, the vehicle's passenger compart-
ment and any containers therein.' 52 The Court purported to follow
Chime/'s "immediate control" test, 153 yet did not consider whether the
arrestees could have gained access to the jacket's contents.154 Instead, it
adopted a "straightforward rule, easily applied and predictably en-
forced": 155 An officer conducting a custodial arrest of a vehicle's occu-
pant may conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of
the vehicle and any containers located there.' 56 The Court defended
this rule by asserting "that articles inside the relatively narrow compass
of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within" an arrestee's immediate control.' 57 De-
spite this assertion, Belton authorizes warrantless passenger compartment
searches in the nonexigent circumstances in which evidence or weapons
in a vehicle's passenger compartment are beyond an arrestee's immedi-
ate control. 58
148 People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577
(1980), revd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
'49 See 449 U.S. 1109 (1980).
150 See 453 U.S. at 463.
151 Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, wrote the majority opinion. Although Justice Rehnquist joined the majority
opinion, he preferred that the Court either not apply the exclusionary rule to the states or
apply the "automobile exception" to allow the search. Id at 463 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
152 See id at 460.
153 See id at 460 n.3.
154 The arrestees outnumbered the trooper four-to-one and were standing outside of the
car when the trooper searched the passenger compartment and jacket. Brief for Petitioner at
3, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The trooper did not handcuff any of the ar-
restees. Id He stated that he never felt threatened and did not draw his service revolver
during the arrest and search. Brief for Respondent at 12, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).
155 453 U.S. at 459.
156 Id at 460.
[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the con-
tents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers
in it be within his reach.
Id (footnotes omitted).
157 See id
158 With the retirement of Justice Stewart, only four members of the Belton majority
remain on the Court. Seesupra note 151. At least one of them,Justice Rehnquist, preferred to
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Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, 59 but considered the
majority's rule a "massive broadening" of the search-incident-to-arrest
exception.1 60 He feared that the rule would allow police to conduct
"unreasonable searches" after every arrest, including arrests for traffic
violations. 16' He preferred that the Court instead apply a broad auto-
mobile exception.'
62
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority approach as "an-
alytically unsound" and inconsistent with earlier search-incident-to-ar-
rest decisions. 163 He maintained that the majority ignored Chimel "and
instead adopt[ed] a fiction-that the interior of a car is always within the
immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car."'
64
In a short dissent, Justice White described the majority approach as "an
extreme extension of Chime!. 165
3. Summag,
After Ross and Belton, the automobile exception authorizes police
who have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a
crime to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle 6 6 and any
containers in it.167 The police may conduct the search immediately at
the scene of the stop, or later, after seizing the vehicle and taking it to
the police station. ' 8 Furthermore, if a police officer lawfully arrests a
vehicle's occupant, the search-incident-to-arrest exception authorizes the
decide the case under the automobile exception, which he believed should allow the warrant-
less search. See supra note 151. Because the Ross Court extended the automobile exception to
authorize warrantless container searches like that in Belton, Justice Rehnquist may now be
less likely to embrace the Belton rule. Although it is doubtful that the Court will overrule
Belton, expansion of the Be/ton rule appears unlikely and unnecessary after Ross.
159 The substance of Justice Stevens's concurring opinion appears in his dissent in Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 444 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overmled, United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
160 See 453 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens referred to a
"massive broadening of the automobile exception," his opinion makes clear that he is con-
cerned with the Court's treatment of the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
161 See id. at 451 n.12. Justice Stevens maintained that the majority's approach would
allow police officers to search any vehicle, or any containers in vehicles, without probable
cause to search if the search was incident to a "custodial arrest," an arrest in which the officer
takes custody of the arrestee. Noting an absence of constitutional restraints on a police of-
ficer's ability to make custodial arrests, see id at 450 n. 11, Justice Stevens argued that the
Belton approach potentially could apply to every arrest. He did, however, recognize that
there are state constitutional restraints on custodial arrests for traffic violations. Id n.12. See
aso incfa notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The Court later adopted Justice Stevens's
proposed automobile exception in Ross. See supra text accompanying note 123.
163 See 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164 Id at 466 (emphasis in original).
165 Id at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
166 See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam).
167 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
168 See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982) (per curiam); Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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officer to conduct an immediate warrantless search of the arrestee 169 and
the vehicle's passenger compartment, 170 as well as any containers on the
arrestee's person 171 or in the passenger compartment. 172 Although-the
search-incident-to-arrest exception requires an arrest supported by prob-
able cause to arrest, it does not require that police have probable cause
to search. 173 The search-incident-to-arrest exception does not allow
searches "remote in time or place from the arrest."
74
II
THE BURGER COURT'S ANALYSIS: AN EVALUATION AND
EXPLANATION
In Ross and Belton, the Burger Court tried to resolve difficult issues
raised by warrantless vehicle searches. Both cases reveal a Court strug-
gling to accomplish three objectives: establish understandable and eas-
ily-applied rules, 175 articulate convincing justifications of the rules, and
achieve a consensus within the Court. The Court's efforts have yielded
limited success. Ultimately, the problems that the Court is struggling to
alleviate are the consequences of its own decisions, decisions that sever
the automobile and search-incident-to-arrest exceptions from their origi-
nal justifications--exigency created by a threat to evidence or to police.
A. The Automobile Exception
1. Application
The Burger Court's automobile exception applies whenever police
have probable cause to believe that the vehicle to be searched contains
evidence of a crime. The Court has articulated three rationales to sup-
port this rule: inherent mobility of vehicles, 176 diminished expectations
of privacy in vehicles, 177 and the administrative burdens of seizing and
storing vehicles.' 78 These rationales do not adequately support the
broad application of the automobile exception.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
170 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
172 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
173 Probable cause to arrest may exist when probable cause to search is absent. See 1 W.
LAFAVE, .upra note 16, at 441-42. Police making arrests for traffic violations, see, e.g., United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), or conducting material witness arrests, see, e.g.,
United States v. Farinacci-Garcia, 551 F. Supp. 465 (D.P.R. 1982), may have probable cause
to arrest but not to search.
174 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
175 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2161-62 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 458-59 (1981).
176 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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a. Inherent Mobiliy. The Court correctly characterizes vehicles as
inherently mobile; yet it does not identify any logical nexus between
inherent mobility and an exception to the warrant requirement. When
a suspect or arrestee can move a vehicle before a magistrate issues a
warrant, circumstances necessitate a warrantless search. When the vehi-
cle is inherently mobile but actually immobile, no reason exists to excuse
police from obtaining a warrant. "Inherent mobility" appears to be a
catchword for diminished fourth amendment protection, not a substan-
tive rationale for excusing noncompliance with the warrant
requirement.
b. Diminished Expectations of Privay. The Court has asserted that
people have lesser expectations of privacy in their automobiles than in
other property, and relies upon this assertion to justify warrantless ve-
hicle searches and to distinguish vehicles from containers. The Court's
analysis of privacy expectations, however, is flawed. First, the validity of
the Court's basic assertion is questionable. 79 People reasonably expect
that the contents of their trunk or glove compartment or objects beneath
their seats will remain private. Furthermore, people often use vehicles
as residences or as containers for personal effects; 180 therefore, the Court
should not summarily deny vehicles the privacy protection that it ac-
cords residences and containers. 181
Second, the reasons upon which the Court has relied to support its
assertion that people have lesser expectations of privacy in vehicles are
not convincing. The Court has articulated the following reasons: a ve-
hicle is a means of transportation, not a residence; a vehicle is exposed to
public scrutiny; and a vehicle is subject to governmental regulation. 182
These facts fail to distinguish vehicles from residences and containers.
People often use vehicles as residences and places to store personal ef-
fects. Vehicles are no less incapable of escaping public scrutiny than are
people and personal property carried in public. Furthermore, resi-
dences are also subject to governmental regulation, yet receive full
fourth amendment protection. 183 Thus, there are flaws in the reasoning
that the Court employs to reach the conclusion that people have lesser
expectations of privacy in vehicles.
Finally, assuming that people do have diminished privacy expecta-
tions in vehicles, that alone does not justify warrantless vehicle searches.
The warrant requirement ensures that a neutral and detached magis-
179 See Wilson, supira note 16, at 130; Comment, supra note 14, at 951-53.
180 See Wilson, supra note 16, at 158; Comment, supra note 14, at 957.
18 1 See e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (search warrant required for search
to arrest at residence); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (warrant required
for luggage search).
182 See supra note 54.
183 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (search warrant required for search
to arrest at residence).
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trate will assess the reasonableness of a search in order to determine its
permissibility. 184 Lesser privacy expectations in a vehicle, however, will
not ensure that a police officer will be detached and neutral when decid-
ing whether to search a vehicle. Regardless of an individual's expecta-
tions of privacy in a vehicle, the reasons for the warrant requirement
still apply to vehicle searches.' 8 5
c. Administraive Burdens. The Court has applied the automobile ex-
ception as a means of relieving police departments of the burdens of
seizing and storing vehicles pending the issuance of search warrants; yet
the Court fails to support its assertion that these burdens are "severe,
even impossible." 8 6 Even assuming the validity of the Court's concerns,
this rationale suffers from an over-generalization. The Court does not
contend that a storage requirement would impose undue burdens on all
police departments; indeed, the Court recognizes that some departments
have resources and facilities sufficient to store vehicles. 8 7 Although ad-
ministrative burdens may justify warrantless vehicle searches when a po-
lice department cannot seize and hold vehicles, these burdens do not
support such searches when a police department has sufficient resources
to seize and hold vehicles while police seek warrants.
The cogency of the administrative-burdens rationale suffers from
another weakness: the Court has allowed warrantless vehicle searches
conducted after police had seized the vehicle, taken it to the police sta-
tion, and held it there.'88 In these instances, the police manifested an
ability and a willingness to bear the burdens of seizure and storage.
Thus, it is difficult to understand the Court's reliance on these burdens
as a reason for allowing warrantless searches.
2. Scope
After the Supreme Court had decided that the automobile excep-
tion applies whenever police have probable cause to search a vehicle, it
184 See supra note 15.
185 The Court may have adopted the unarticulated position that, given the diminished
privacy expectations of vehicle users, the administrative burdens of obtaining a search war-
rant outweigh the diminished privacy interests that the requirement would protect.
186 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979), limited on othergrounda, United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2155 (1982); see The Supreme Court, 1981 Teim, supra note 114, at 183
("The. . .concern seems to be based on the dubious fear that some mysterious confederate
will sneak into the police parking lot with an extra set of keys and remove evidence and on
the further doubtful assumption that present police storage facilities are inadequate.').
187 "Such a constitutional requirement [of seizure and storage of vehicles pending issu-
ance of a warrant] . . . would have imposed severe, even impossible burdens on many police
departments." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979) (emphasis added), lim-
ited on other grounds, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2155 (1982). Some vehicles pose more
significant storage burdens than do others. See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 670 F.2d 185
(11th Cir. 1982) (airplane search).




had to decide the proper scope of an automobile-exception search. In
United States v. Ross, the Court concluded that a warrantless automobile
exception search extends to the entire vehicle and any containers in it.
The Court offered three reasons to justify this extensive scope: previous
Supreme Court decisions, perceived needs of law enforcement agencies,
and privacy interests. These reasons, however, fail to justify adequately
the broad scope of the Burger Court's automobile exception.
a. Previous Decisions. In United States v. Ross, the Court argued that
earlier decisions support its conclusion that the automobile exception
extends to all compartments and containers in vehicles. 189 The Court
relied on four cases to buttress this argument. None of these cases sup-
ports the result in Ross.
First, the Court noted that both Carroll v. United States and Chambers
v. Maroney authorized warrantless searches of concealed areas in the ve-
hicles. The Court interprets this as a mandate to extend the automobile
exception to all containers and compartments in a vehicle.190 By relying
on Carroll and Chambers, the Court ignored a fundamental difference be-
tween a concealed compartment that is a part of a vehicle and a movea-
ble container that is located in a vehicle: police can more easily seize
and hold containers pending issuance of a warrant. Indeed, a majority
of the Supreme Court has recognized this distinction between vehicles
and containers. 191
The Ross Court also invoked Husty v. United States 192 and Scher v.
United States, 193 cases in which the Court upheld warrantless automobile
searches that extended to containers. 194 Husty and Scher are only mini-
mally persuasive, however, for.as the Court conceded, the parties in
those cases did not argue that police needed a warrant to search the
containers. 195
The validity of the Ross Court's reliance upon these cases is suspect
189 e Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
190 If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the upholstery in Car-
roll, it certainly would have been reasonable for them to look into a burlap
sack stashed inside; if it was reasonable to open the concealed compartment in
Chambrs, it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag crum-
pled within it.
Id
191 Se supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text; see also Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2179 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("Surely an integral compartment within a car is just as mobile, and
presents the same practical problems of safekeeping, as the car itself. This cannot be said of
movable containers located within the car.").
192 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
193 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
194 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
195 Id In Ross, the majority and dissent disagreed about the importance of Hus , and
Scher. The majority contended that "[t]he fact that no such argument was even made illumi-
nates the profession's understanding of the scope of the search permitted under Carro/I " Id
In dissent, Justice Marshall labeled this an "unusual approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion." Id at 2178 n.7.
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for another reason. All four cases preceded the Court's privacy-expecta-
tions analysis19 6 and were decided when exigency defined the permissi-
ble scope of a search. Now that the Court considers an analysis of
privacy expectations central to its automobile exception, it should hesi-
tate to rely on decisions predating that analysis. The persuasiveness of
these decisions is the weakest when the Court seeks to apply the automo-
bile exception to areas in which people have high expectations of ri-
vacy, such as containers and closed compartments in vehicles.
b. Law Enforcement Needs. The Ross Court also extends the auto-
mobile exception to containers in vehicles in order to promote more effi-
cient law enforcement. According to the Court, a contrary rule would
render the automobile exception impotent because criminals usually en-
close contraband in containers, 197 and unnecessary because police de-
partments that hold vehicles while seeking warrants to search containers
in them could also seek warrants to search the vehicles.198 Assuming
that these assertions are true, they fail to dictate the resulting rule.
By allowing the vitality of the automobile exception to control its
scope, the Court exalts police efficiency in the form of a robust automo-
bile exception over both logic and the fourth amendment. If a limited
scope of the exception would frequently render the application of the
automobile exception useless or unnecessary, perhaps the Court should
reconsider the applicability of the exception. Instead, the Court makes
the automobile exception an end in itself and expands its scope to in-
sure its usefulness to police.
In short, the Court is apparently unwilling to allow limitations on
the scope of the automobile exception, limitations dictated by what the
Court admits are differences'between vehicles and containers, 199 to im-
pede extensive vehicle searches:
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets,
drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between glove com-
partments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the
case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and
efficient completion of the task at hand.2°°
Thus, the Ross Court, somewhat incredibly, explicitly adopted the
position that more efficient law enforcement warrants the curtailment of
fourth amendment protection. This directly contradicts the Court's
general rule that "the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard for the Fourth
196 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.




c. Privaqy Interests. The Ross Court concluded that a rule allowing
police to conduct warrantless searches of containers in vehicles will pro-
tect the privacy interests of vehicle users. Police unsure whether contra-
band is in a container or a "yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle" will
be able to search the container instead of "combing" the entire vehicle
for evidence. 20 2 In dissent, Justice Marshall exposed a flaw in this
argument:
The search will not always require a "combing" of the entire vehicle,
since police may be looking for a particular item and may discover it
promptly. If, instead, they are looking more generally for evidence of
a crime, the immediate opening of a container will not protect the
defendant's privacy; whether or not it contains contraband, the police
will continue to search for new evidence.
203
In short, the object of the search, not the presence of unopened contain-
ers, will usually determine the extent of a warrantless vehicle search.
Thus, police may "comb" vehicles for evidence despite the rule in Ross.
Even if the Ross rule would protect privacy interests by limiting
thorough police searches, that alone does not justify the broad scope of
the Court's automobile exception. If an extensive search would be an
undue privacy intrusion, the vehicle-user would consent to an immedi-
ate warrantless search of unopened containers to avoid the greater intru-
sion.204 Thus, the Ross rule is not necessary to prevent unwanted
intrusions on privacy.
B. The Burger Court's Search for Simplicity
Although the reasons that the Burger Court has given to support its
rules governing warrantless vehicle searches, under both the automobile
and search-incident-to-arrest exceptions, are not persuasive, 20 5 the ex-
ceptions may be justifiable as "bright-line" rules necessary and sufficient
to guide lower courts and police. Courts and commentators have recog-
nized the importance of understandable fourth amendment doctrine,
doctrine that governs routine police conduct.20 6 This concern is at least
201 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (emphasis added);setalo Ross, 102S. Ct.
at 2181 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202 102 S. Ct. at 2171 n.28.
203 Id at 2179 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204 Cf. id at 2179-80 (arguing that user would consent to search to avoid having car
impounded).
205 See supra notes 157-58, 176-204 and accompanying text.
206 See, e.g., 102 S. Ct. at 2161 ("There is. . .no dispute among judges about the impor-
tance of striving for clarification in this area of the law."). Professor LaFave advocates a
"standardized procedure" rather than "case-by-case adjudication":
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule,
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and
thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police
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partially responsible for the Burger Court's automobile and vehicle
search-incident-to-arrest exceptions. The Court has attempted to sim-
plify the exceptions by replacing case-by-case analysis with generally ap-
plicable rules. The success of the Court's attempt to provide
"straightforward rule[s], easily applied, and predictably enforced" 20 7 de-
pends upon whether these rules are necessary to guide police; whether
they in fact provide guidance; and whether their benefits exceed their
costs, unwarranted privacy intrusions. 208 Based on these standards, the
Court's "bright-line" rules have failed.
1. The Automobile Exception. Generalized Application Versus an
Exigeng-Based Approach
The Burger Court has attempted to simplify the automobile excep-
tion by adopting a generalized application of the rationales for the ex-
ception or by ignoring the rationales completely. First, the Court
assumes that people always haye diminished privacy expectations in ve-
hicles without considering their actual expectations. 20 9 Second, the
Court refuses to require any police departments to seize and hold vehi-
cles pending issuance of a warrant although it recognizes that many
could comply with such a requirement.210 Third, the Court relies on
"inherent mobility," a denominator common to all automobiles, rather
than actual mobility, an inquiry that would necessitate a case-by-case
approach.21' Finally, when faced with containers located in vehicles
in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily
engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinc-
tions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers
and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field."
LaFave, supra note 11, at 141 (footnotes omitted). In his article Professor LaFave considered
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), which held that a search incident to arrest of
the arrestee's person was neither limited by the probability that the arrestee could reach a
weapon, see supra note 113, nor restricted to the intensity necessary to discover weapons or
evidence. LaFave agrees with the majority's rejection of these limitations because they would
require case-by-case adjudication. See LaFave, supra note 11, at 140-41, 149, 150. Although
Professor LaFave advocates an unambiguous fourth amendment doctrine, see id at 162, he
has not embraced all of the Burger Court's bright-line rules. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16,
at 152-60 (Supp. 1983) (criticizing the Belton bright-line rule).
207 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981).
208 Professor LaFave has conducted a similar inquiry and concludes that the Be/ton rule is
unnecessary, that it does not produce results approximating those produced by case-by-case
analysis, and that it is somewhat ambiguous and subject to abuse. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 16, at 153-60 (Supp. 1983).
209 See generally supra notes 53-54, 179-85 and accompanying text.
2 10 See general' supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
211 See Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079, 3081 (1982) (per curiam) (application of
automobile exception not dependent "upon a reviewing court's assessment of the likelihood in
each case that the car would have been driven away..."); see g neral supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
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subject to an automobile-exception search, the Court disregards the ra-
tionales for the automobile exception and allows warrantless searches of
all containers.
The Court's departure from the exigency analysis of Carroll v. United
States was not necessary to provide police with clear guidance.21 2 Al-
though the difficulty of the diminished privacy expectations analysis ap-
pears to necessitate a general application,213 the Carroll analysis does
not. Strictly construed, Carroll requires two circumstances to validate
warrantless vehicle or container searches: probable cause to search, and
a threat that police would risk loss of evidence by seeking a warrant.
214
Normally, determining the presence of these circumstances would not be
difficult. Courts routinely determine whether probable cause to search
exists. If a police department has sufficient resources to seize and hold
vehicles pending issuance of search warrants, the threat to evidence does
not exist.215 In the unlikely event 216 that they could not prevent an ar-
restee or a confederate from moving or gaining access to a vehicle,21 7
police could conduct an immediate warrantless search.218 Thus, the two
circumstances that Carroll required for warrantless searches, probable
cause to search and a genuine threat to evidence, are sufficient guide-
lines for both courts and police.
Although the Court's recent decisions will eliminate some of the
confusion surrounding the automobile exception, they fail to provide
212 Accord Note, supra note 21, 82 W. VA. L. REV. at 666 ("The original Carroll doctrine
was very simple, clear, and most importantly, easy to apply.").
213 In the context of container searches, the Robbins plurality considered the privacy-ex-
pectations analysis "difficult if not impossible" to apply. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,
426 (1981) (plurality opinion), overraledon othergrounds, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982).
214 See Comment, supra note 14, at 936 ("[I]n the absence of. . . true exigency. . . the
warrantless search of a vehicle should be prohibited. . . "). This approach wotld abolish
an "automobile exception" authorizing disparate treatment of vehicles; the existence of exi-
gency, not the presence of an automobile, would validate a warrantless search.
215 Police departments could be required to establish their general incapacity to seize and
securely store vehicles. Factors such as past practice, manpower, existing facilities, and
budget allocations would be relevant. Once a court determined that a police department was
or was not capable of seizure and storage, principles of collateral estoppel and judicial notice
would aid future judicial determination. Initial determination would also provide sufficient
guidance'for police.
216 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
217 For cases involving confederates of arrestees seeking to move vehicles, see Note, supra
note 7; at 843 n.41.
218 If police have probable cause to search and to arrest a vehicle's occupant, they should
conduct the arrest. Once police can lawfully detain the vehicle's occupant and seize the vehi-
cle, there is no threat of mobility, and thus no need for a warrantless search. Probable cause
to arrest and probable cause to search, however, do not always coexist. See 1 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 16, at 443. If police have probable cause to search a vehicle, but lack probable
cause to arrest its occupant, the threat that the occupant may move the vehicle exists. This
situation, however, is rare. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2178 n.6 (1982) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
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sufficient guidance to police. The applicability of the automobile excep-
tion in a number of contexts is still unclear. For example, the Court has
not decided whether the exception applies to unoccupied, parked vehi-
cles.219 Furthermore, the Court has not decided whether the exception
allows warrantless searches of vehicles that commonly serve as resi-
dences, or whether police must consider such vehicles to be residences
and seek warrants before searching them.220 Nor is the scope of the au-
tomobile exception altogether clear. The Court has not determined
whether the exception extends to the person of a vehicle's occupant 221 or
to containers affixed to a vehicle's roof.
222
Additional confusion may result from the Court's distinction be-
tween probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a
container in a vehicle. If police have probable cause to search an entire
vehicle, they can conduct warrantless searches of all containers located
there. But if the probable cause focuses on a container, police must ob-
tain a warrant to conduct the search.223 Probable cause is flexible, how-
219 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1982) ("we consider the extent to
which police officers-who have legitimately stopped an automobile" may search compart-
ments and containers within) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2174 n.l, 2175 n.2 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Ross rule does not apply to unoccupied, parked vehicles). Some lower federal
courts have applied the automobile exception to warrantless searches of unoccupied, parked
vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (Ist Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit, however, has referred
to the automobile exception as the "moving vehicle exception," thus indicating that it will
not apply the automobile exception to unoccupied, parked vehicles. See, e.g., United States v.
Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979); United States v.
Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
If the automobile exception does not apply to unoccupied, parked vehicles, the courts
must determine whether police may refrain from seeking a search warrant and instead wait
for a vehicle's occupant to return, so that the automobile exception will apply. In Ross the car
searched was unoccupied when police first saw it; only after they had left and later returned
did the police see the defendant driving the car. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
220 Lower courts disagree about whether the automobile exception applies to mobile
homes. Compare United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981) (not applicable),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1775 (1982) with United States v. Hudson, 601 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.
1979) (applicable).
221 In United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948), the Court refused to extend the
automobile exception to occupants of vehicles. In light of the recent expansion of the auto-
mobile exception, the precedential value of Di Re is suspect. In any event, the vitality of Di
Re is largely academic; because probable cause to search usually coexists with probable cause
to arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) will in most cases authorize a war-
rantless search incident to arrest of the person of the arrested vehicle occupant. See supra notes
106-09 and accompanying text.
222 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1982) (Court addresses scope of a
"search of compartments and containers within the vehicle. . . ") (emphasis added).
223 By reaffirming Chadwick and Sanders to the extent that the probable cause in those
cases focused on a specific container, the Ross Court distinguished probable cause to search a
container in a vehicle from probable cause to search a vehicle generally and made clear that
the automobile exception applies only when the latter exists. See Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2165-69.
The Fifth Circuit recently failed to recognize the significance of this distinction when it held
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ever, and its focus may shift during a search. Police may begin a search
with probable cause to search the entire vehicle because they believe
that a particular container located somewhere in a vehicle contains con-
traband. When police locate the container, however, they have prob-
able cause to search it alone. It is not clear whether the controlling
probable cause is that existing when police commence the search, or
that existing after police find the container. If the relevant probable
cause is that existing when the search begins, the automobile exception
would apply and police could search the container without a warrant; if
the focus is on the time when the police discover the container, the ex-
ception would not apply and police would need a warrant to search the
container.
Similarly, the distinction between compartments and containers in
a vehicle, a distinction that the Ross Court did not discuss, may create
confusion. Because the automobile exception only applies when police
have probable cause to search a vehicle generally, not merely a specific
container in a vehicle, the categorization of glove compartments and
trunks has practical significance. If these compartments are treated as
the equivalent of moveable containers, the automobile exception would
not apply when police had probable cause to search a car trunk; police
would need a warrant. But if these compartments are categorized as
part of a vehicle, the automobile exception would apply; police with
probable cause to search the glove compartment could open and search
closed containers in the trunk.224
Thus, the Court's "bright-line" automobile exception fails to pro-
vide police with guidance in a number of circumstances. The methodol-
ogy that the Court employs in its vehicle-search decisions is one reason
for this failure. By severing the automobile exception from the rationales
that support it, the Court has taken from police their only means of
understanding whether and how the exception applies in new situations.
As Justice Brennan notes, the Court "leaves open too many questions
and, more important, it provides the police and the courts with too few
that Ross allowed federal agents to conduct warrantless automobile exception searches of bun-
dles of marihuana that they seized from cars. See United States v. Rivera, 684 F.2d 308 (5th
Cir. 1982). The agents had probable cause to search the bundles, not the cars; the automobile
exception should not have applied.
For a discussion of problems posed by the distinction between probable cause to search
vehicles and probable cause to search containers in vehicles, see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at
174-76 (Supp. 1983).
224 The Court has distinguished vehicles from moveable containers on the basis of pri-
vacy expectations and the ease with which police can seize and store containers. See supra
notes 68-75 and accompanying text. This two-pronged test is inadequate for conclusively
categorizing trunks and glove compartments as either "containers" or "vehicles." These com-
partments are analogous to moveable containers in that people have high expectations that




tools with which to find the answers. '225
Finally, the costs of the Burger Court's automobile exception, un-
warranted privacy intrusions, exceed its benefits. The exception autho-
rizes police officers to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles and
containers when no need to protect evidence exists. Ross is a vivid exam-
ple of the Court's willingness to allow warrantless searches despite con-
siderable costs and minimal benefits. Having acknowledged that people
have legitimate privacy expectations in containers and that police can
easily seize and hold containers while seeking a warrant,226 the Ross
Court nonetheless allows warrantless searches of containers that happen
to be located in vehicles.
2. The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception.- Bzght Line Rules Versus
Immediate Control
In New York v. Belton, the Court noted that the difficulty of applying
the search-incident-to-arrest exception's "immediate control" test to ve-
hicle searches had left lower courts in "disarray. 22 7 The Court then
concluded "that articles inside . . . the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably within" the arres-
tee's immediate control.228 In response, the Court adopted a "bright-
line" rule: an arresting officer may conduct a warrantless search of a
vehicle's passenger compartment and any containers therein as a con-
temporaneous incident of an arrest.229 As was the case with the automo-
bile exception, the Court's "bright-line" rule for the vehicle search-
incident-to-arrest exception is unnecessary, unsuccessful, and an in-
fringement on privacy interests.
Although the application of the "immediate-control" test to vehicle
searches may have somewhat confused lower courts, the Court did not
need to adopt the drastic Belton rule in response. Instead, the Court
could have alleviated the confusion by requiring police officers to take
reasonable precautions to prevent arrestees from gaining access to weap-
ons or evidence in vehicles. Police can usually eliminate such a threat
by removing an arrestee from his vehicle, closing the vehicle's doors, and
either placing the arrestee in the police car or handcuffing him.2 30 In-
225 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although
Belton involved a search incident to arrest, and not an automobile-exception search, Justice
Brennan's observation also applies to the Court's automobile exception.
226 Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2166 n.16.
227 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 n.1 (1981).
228 Id at 459.
229 See id at 460.
230 See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 158 (Supp. 1983); cf. United States v. Frick, 490
F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, Cj., concurring and dissenting) ("Had the [arrest-
ing] agents nevertheless feared that [the arrestee] might reach exceptional levels of strength
and cunning as a result of his desparate plight, surely the simple expedient of closing and
locking the car door would have had the salutary effect of protecting the defendant's interests
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deed, "the 'difficulty' and 'disarray' the Belton majority alluded to has
been more a product of the police seeing how much they could get away
with. . . than their being confronted with inherently ambiguous situa-
tions."'23 ' Thus, a rule authorizing warrantless searches only when the
arresting officers cannot reasonably prevent access to the interior of the
arrestee's vehicle would both eliminate threats to police and evidence
and alleviate whatever confusion the immediate-control test
engendered.
232
Additionally, the "bright-line" rule in Belton leaves a number of
questions unanswered. It is unclear whether the search-incident-to-ar-
rest exception applies when the arrestee is handcuffed, 233 when the ar-
restee has been outside the vehicle for a considerable length of time,23
4
or when the arrestee is no longer near the vehicle.235 The rule also fails
to determine whether police may search locked suitcases, glove compart-
ments, or trunks.
236
Finally, the Court's vehicle search-incident-to-arrest exception un-
duly infringes on privacy interests. The Belton rule allows warrantless
vehicle and container searches even when there is no threat to police or
evidence 237 or a threat that police could easily eliminate by taking pre-
in privacy while guarding the safety of the officers and the integrity of the investigation from
an irrational rampage.'). If police took these precautions, the passenger compartment would
not be "generally" or "inevitably" within the arrestee's immediate control.
231 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 158 (Supp. 1983).
232 To govern those situations in which arresting officers cannot reasonably prevent ac-
cess, the Court could either adopt a general rule authorizing warrantless searches of the pas-
senger compartment or an "immediate-control" rule. For factors relevant to the latter, see 2
W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 499-500.
233 Because a handcuffed arrestee usually cannot gain access to a passenger compart-
ment, Be/ton should not apply. But see United States v. Enriquez, 675 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (Be/ton applicable although defendant handcuffed); United States v. Col-
lins, 668 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1982); Government of V.I. v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 585-92
(3d Cir. 1981); 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 155 (Supp. 1983).
234 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 155 (Supp. 1983); cf Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368
(1964) (proscribing search incident to arrest "remote in time or place from the arrest').
235 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,469-70 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Musick, 534 F. Supp. 954, 963 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (Be/ton not applicable if arrestee not
at scene); 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 155-56 (Supp. 1983) (suggesting that Be/ton limited
to "on-the-scene" searches); cf. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (proscribing
search incident to arrest "remote in time or place from the arrest").
236 Although the Be/on Court held that the "bright-line" rule extends to closed containers
in a passenger compartment, see 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4, it did not discuss locked containers.
Locked glove compartments and suitcases impede access more than closed glove compart-
ments and suitcases do. Accord 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 156-57 (Supp. 1983). An
arrestee's access to the contents of a locked container or glove compartment in the vehicle is
no greater than his access to the contents of a locked trunk. The Be/ton Court did not address
the applicability of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to trunks. See 453 U.S. at 460-61
n.4; United States v. Danhi, 525 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (D. Mass. 1981) (Be/ton inapplicable to
locked car trunk, especially when police have the keys).
237 See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
1982]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
cautions.238 The ease with which police can abuse the Belton rule im-
poses an additional cost. Because the search-incident-to-arrest exception
for vehicles allows warrantless searches incident to any custodial arrest,
police may use traffic violations or other minor arrests as pretexts to
conduct extensive searches of people, vehicles, and containers.
23 9
C. An Explanation of the Vehicle Search Decisions: An Attack on
the Exclusionary Rule
The Burger Court's treatment of warrantless vehicle searches is dif-
ficult to understand. Having abandoned exigency-based approaches,
the Court has adopted rules that lack substantive support, fail to pro-
vide guidance to police and courts, and unnecessarily infringe on pri-
vacy interests. Perhaps the only clue to the Court's motivation for these
decisions is a discernible trend in the decisions: expansion of police
power to conduct warrantless searches.
24°
This trend arguably betrays hostility toward the requirement that
police obtain a warrant before conducting searches and seizures.24' On
closer examination, however, this explanation is not plausible. Recent
cases indicate that a majority of the Court continues to support the war-
rant requirement. 242
238 See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
239 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 450-51 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 139-40; LaFave, sura note 11, at 150-61. Even if a police officer
conducts an arrest as a pretext to conduct a search incident to arrest of a vehicle, its passen-
gers, or its contents, the search is constitutional, despite the officer's motives, if the arrest is
lawful. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (objective circumstances, not state of
mind, control constitutionality of search).
240 The Burger Court expanded the automobile and the search-incident-to-arrest excep-
tions in Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Ross, 102
S. Ct. 2157 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S.
1 (1980) (per curiam); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) "overruled" Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981)(plurality opinion), see sura note 127 and accompany-
ing text, and interpreted Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) to require police to obtain
warrants only when the automobile exception is inapplicable, seesura note 128 and accompa-
nying text; as a result, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1973) (plurality opinion) is
the only Burger Court decision that restricts police officers' ability to conduct warrantless
vehicle searches. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. The Court has also upheld
warrantless vehicle searches for reasons other than the automobile and search-incident-to-
arrest exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border
search); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless search constitutional as part
of police caretaking function). But see, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (fourth
amendment restricts ability to conduct border searches without probable cause); United
States v. Brignoni-Prince, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (border search based on suspicion created by
vehicle occupant's ancestry unconstitutional).
241 See supra note 15.
242 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982); cf. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980) (arrest warrant).
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The trend may also indicate that the Court has concluded that real
property is entitled to greater fourth amendment protection than is per-
sonal property.243 Arguably, the Court is willing to require that police
obtain a warrant only in those cases in which they search real property.
Indeed, a plurality of the Court has construed Coolidge v. New Hampshire
as providing enhanced fourth amendment protection to vehicles located
on private property.244 Furthermore, "inherent. mobility," one of the
Court's justifications for the automobile exception, 245 distinguishes real
property, which is not inherently mobile, from personal property, which
is mobile. Although the Court may eventually conclude that the fourth
amendment warrant requirement protects only real property, 246 it has
yet to reach such a conclusion. Indeed, recent decisions mandating war-
rant-requirement protection for containers not subject to the automobile
243 Justice Blackmun has argued for diminished warrant requirement protection for per-
sonal property: "[A] warrant [should] not [be] required to seize and search any movable
property in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place." United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 19 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244 See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974) (plurality opinion).
245 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
246 There are indications that the Supreme Court may eventually create a "container
exception" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. Taken in conjunction with the
automobile exception, a "container exception" would limit warrant requirement protection
to real property. The Court's desire to establish "bright-line" rules may lead to such an
exception. Although police with probable cause to search luggage clearly must obtain a war-
rant to do so, see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), limited, United States v. Ross, 102
S. Ct. 2157 (1982); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), it is not clear whether the
warrant requirement protects less "worthy" containers. When the same issue arose with re-
spect to the application of the automobile exception to containers located in vehicles, the
resulting dispute among members of the Court, see supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text,
and disarray in lower courts, see, e.g., cases cited in United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159,
1174-76 nn. 3 & 4 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm, J., dissenting), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), led
the Supreme Court to allow warrantless searches of all containers in vehicles that are subject
to an automobile-exception search. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). In
order to avoid similar confusion with respect to warrantless searches of containers that are not
located in vehicles, the Court either may adopt a "container exception" or may apply the
warrant requirement to all containers. See id at 2171 (Court refuses to distinguish worthy
from unworthy containers). A further source of confusion, and thus an impetus for a "bright-
line" rule allowing warrantless container searches, is the definition of "containers." See, e.g.,
United States v. Weber, 668 F.2d 552, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1981) (rolled-up rainslicker containing
walkie-talkie is a container), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2904 (1982); United States v. Hodge, 519 F.
Supp. 654, 656 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (blanket not a container); ef New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 n.4 (1981) (definition of container for purposes of search-incident-to-arrest excep-
tion).
Whether or not the Court adopts a "container exception," see infra note 247 and accom-
panying text, the Court's search-incident-to-arrest analysis in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981) may lead to expanded police power to conduct warrantless searches of containers
in the possession of arrestees. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text. In cases not
involving vehicles, and in which arrestees at the scene of the arrest lack immediate control
over containers, lower federal courts have cited to Belton to uphold warrantless searches as
incident to arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per
curiam); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588, 591-93 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1003 (1982). See generaly Note, supra note 16, 9 FORDHAM URB. LJ. at 206-11.
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exception indicate that the Court is not yet willing to distinguish be-
tween real and personal property when applying the fourth
amendment.
2 47
The Burger Court's vehicle-search decisions can best be explained
as a hostile response to the exclusionary rule. Rather than apply the rule
as a sanction for violations of the fourth amendment, the Court denies
the existence of fourth amendment rights by expanding exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Both the Burger Court's fourth amendment
decisions248 and opinions of individual justices demonstrate the Court's
disapproval of the exclusionary rule.2 49 Indeed, several Justices250 and a
247 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), limited, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) ("We do not agree that the
Warrant Clause [of the fourth amendment] protects only dwellings. .. 2).
248 See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (illegally seized evidence
admissible to impeach defendant's cross-examination testimony); Michigan v. DeFillipio, 443
U.S. 31, 39-40 (1979) (evidence seized in good faith pursuant to city ordinance admissible,
although ordinance held unconstitutional on appeal); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134
(1978) (no violation of fourth amendment if individual subject to warrantless vehicle search
lacks possessory interest or control over vehicle or objects discovered in search); Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) ("[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of-
ficer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objec-
tively, justify that action."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (federal district court
cannot consider habeas corpus petition of state prisoner who had full and fair opportunity to
litigate fourth amendment claim in state courts); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976) (evidence obtained by unconstitutional means admissible to prove bookmaking activ-
ity in civil tax assessment suit); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1974) (exclu-
sionary rule not applicable to grand jury proceedings). For an examination of the Burger
Court's treatment of the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Burkoff, The Court That Devoured The Fourth
Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionag Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 141 (1979);
Saltzburg, Foreword- The Flow and Ebb of the Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and
Burger Courts, 69 GEo. L.J. 151, 191-97 (1980); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclu-
sionaq Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L REV. 251 (1974). On the exclusionary
rule in general, see, e.g., the studies and articles cited in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
447 n.18 (underlying policy), 499 n.21 (alternatives), 450 n.22 (effectiveness) (1976); Ball, Good
Faith and the Fourth Amendment.. The "Reasonable" Fxception to the Exdusonay Rule, 69 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOY 635 (1978); Canon, The Excluonay Rule: Have Critics Proven that it Doesn't
Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionar, Rule an "Illogical" or "Un-
natural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Schlesinger, The Ex-
clusionagy Rule.- Have Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979);
Wilkey, The Exclusionag Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidnce?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978). See
generall.y 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 3-219 (1978).
249 See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(exclusionary rule "imposes a burden out of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values
which it seeks to advance"; Mapp should be overruled), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S.
Ct. 2147 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule
should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application in those many circumstances
where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his
conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief'); Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (agreeing with
portion of Justice Black's opinion "which [was] to the effect that the Fourth Amendment
supports no exclusionary rule"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971)
(Burger, C.., dissenting) (exclusionary rule "conceptually sterile and practically ineffective";
goal of deterrence "hardly more than a wistful dream").
250 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); United
[Vol. 68: 105
1982] VEHICLE SEARCHES
number of commentators25' have viewed the Court's recent decisions
limiting fourth amendment rights and defendants' ability to assert them
as covert attacks on the exclusionary rule.
252
The vehicle-search decisions have provided the Court with an ex-
cellent means of indirectly attacking the exclusionary rule. The absence
of substantial authority construing either the automobile exception or
the search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of vehicle searches
has allowed the Burger Court to expand these exceptions without explic-
itly overruling previous decisions.253 Furthermore, the manner in which
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority is engaged in
"slow strangulation of the [exclusionary] rule').
251 See Burkoff, supra note 248, at 159 ("Some commentators have suggested that the aim
of the Burger Court in revamping the doctrinal basis of the exclusionary rule is to emasculate
the rule de facto by systematically narrowing its range of application."); see also Note, supra
note 16, 82 W. VA. L. REv. at 638 (attack on exclusionary rule may explain expansion of
"automobile exception').
252 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), cast doubt on the vitality of the
exclusionary rule. In Calandra, the Court characterized the rule as a judicially created remedy
aimed at deterring police violations of constitutional rights, rather than as a constitutional
right of the party whose rights have been violated. See id at 348; see also United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
By labeling the rule a mere deterrent, the Calandra Court invited a dual attack on the
rule. First, as a deterrent, the rule's continued existence depends upon the absence of substi-
tutes. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword Constitutional Law, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 6-8 (1975) (after Calandra and Peltier, Court cannot impose exclusionary rule upon a
state providing a viable alternative). Calandra indicated that other rules that deter police
misconduct are the constitutional equivalents of the exclusionary rule. See 414 U.S. at 347-48.
Second, as a deterrent, arguably the rule should not apply when application of the rule will
not deter police misconduct. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976) (minimal
deterrent value of applying exclusionary rule in a collateral proceeding does not justify cost of
application). Some courts have already refused to exclude evidence when police, acting rea-
sonably and in good faith, violate the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830, 840-48 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1127 (1981); United
States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 396-99 (W.D. Pa. 1981); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9-
10, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981) (reasonable, good-faith belief that
individual consented to search). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to determine
whether the exclusionary rule "should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to
require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure
at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
436 (1982).
253 Thus, the Belton majority was able to claim that "[o]ur holding today does no more
than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic content
[sic]." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 h.3 (1981). The dissenters claimed, on the
other hand, that the holding was an "extreme extension of Chimel," id at 472 (White, J.,
dissenting) and did "a great disservice" to stare decisis, id at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although it did overrule Robbins and limit Sanders, the Ross Court contended that it did not
violate stare decisis:
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in Robbins v. California
and with the portion of the opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plural-
ity in Robbins relied. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does not pre-
clude this action. Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders,
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the "automobile exception" is articulated makes it conducive to dimin-
ished fourth amendment protection. Most exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement are phrased in terms of their justifications; for example, a
police officer may conduct a warrantless search under the "hot pursuit"
and "consent" exceptions only because the officer is in hot pursuit at the
time of the search or because the arrestee consents to the search. Ex-
panding such exceptions beyond their justifications is usually diffi-
cult. 254 In contrast, the "automobile exception" is not phrased in terms
of its justification; instead, it indicates where, not why, a warrantless
search may take place. The Court, therefore, has been able to ignore the
exigency rationale that originally justified the exception. Additionally,
the Court's view that vehicles do not warrant full fourth amendment
protection has contributed to the expansion of the search-incident-to-
arrest exception as it applies to vehicles.
255
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's reluctance to apply the exclusionary rule has
led it to expand exceptions to the warrant requirement in vehicle-search
cases. This expansion has not only left fourth amendment rights unpro-
tected, but also has failed to provide sufficient guidance for lower courts
and police.256 The Court is thus left with an unwanted but relatively
intact exclusionary rule and an unprincipled and unsatisfactory ap-
proach to warrantless vehicle searches. Furthermore, if the Court or the
Congress eventually accepts or establishes alternatives to the exclusion-
we adhere to our holding in that case; although we reject the precise holding
in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its
judgment and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties
in that case.
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
254 Although the Court has abandoned the exigency-based rules in vehicle-search cases, it
still requires exigency for most of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Com-
ment, supra note 14, at 948; see also Note, supra note 16, 82 W. VA. L. REV. at 639 ("[Tlhe
warrant requirement is being strictly construed in many non-vehicle cases.').
255 For example, courts have even invoked the reasons for the "automobile exception" to
justify warrantless vehicle searches under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. See, e.g.,
United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1973) (while applying the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception, court relies upon mobility of a vehicle and existence of probable
cause to search, two justifications of the automobile exception), cet. denied, 419 U.S. 831
(1974).
256 Ironically, any confusion created by the Court will serve as a further basis for attack-
ing the exclusionary rule:
If the Court's decisions provided clearer guidance to police, fewer suppression
issues would arise, and the Court probably would not be concerned about the
exclusionary rule. Unfortunately, the Court itself has produced confusion
about the scope of [fourth amendment rights] and then has blamed its ensu-
ing problems on the remedy it has chosen to protect the right.
Saltzburg, supra note 248, at 193 n.301. The Court has also used the confusion to extend the
exceptions to the warrant requirement by claiming a need for clear guidelines. See, e.g., New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
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ary rule,2 57 the privacy rights of vehicle users will remain unprotected
because of the Court's indirect attack on the rule.258 If the Court doubts
the constitutional basis or efficacy of the exclusionary rule, it should
either abolish or modify it directly, rather than distort fourth amend-
ment doctrines to avoid applying the rule.
259
Steven D. Clymer
257 See supra note 8 (Supreme Court consideration of good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule); see generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 30-39 (discussion of alternatives to
the exclusionary rule).
258 See, e.g., Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Del. 1982) (civil rights plaintiff de-
nied relief in lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; automobile exception authorized police
conduct).
259 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("If the Court is
troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule's
continued validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to reach what
are perceived as the correct results in specific cases.").
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